In the final paragraph of Section One, Part One, Book Three of the Treatise-the famous 'is-ought paragraph 1 -Hume appears to impose a non-naturalistic constraint on any adequate theory of moral judgment. The paragraph reads:
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may perhaps be found of some importance.
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however of the last consequence.
For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation,
'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded that this small attention would subvert all vulgar systems of morality and let us see that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects nor is perceived by reason.
2
The traditional interpretation of this paragraph takes Hume as arguing for an unbridgeable logical gap between descriptive premises and an evaluative conclusion.
It is not irrational for a disputant according to Hume to concede the factual premises of his opponent while denying the evaluative conclusion. In order for the descriptive premises to entail the conclusion, some intervening premise would be required, the nature of which Hume does not specify.
The difficulty with the received interpretation, however, is that Hume's own version of a valid moral argument-even as he summarizes it briefly in the paragraph preceding the 'is-ought paragraph'-seems to conflict with the logical canon enshrined by the classical reading of 'is-ought'.
In the penultimate paragraph of Section One, Hume says that
The vice entirely escapes you as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason.
It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue therefore may be compared to sounds, colors, heat and cold which according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho' like that too it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real or concern us more than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favorable to virtue, and unfavorable to vice, no more can be requisite,to the regulation of our conduct and behavior.
In apparent contradiction of the 'is-ought paragraph' which immediately follows, Hume in the above passage seems to derive moral judgments directly from a statement indicating the presence of certain feelings of pleasure or pain in man.
To make the 'is-ought paragraph' accord with Hume's philosophical practice has therefore been the object of many of the modern reinterpretations of the paragraph. Alisdair Maclntyre, in an article entitled "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'", turns the received interpretation on its head and reads Hume as saying that a deduction from factual premises to an evaluative conclusion is possible.
The What the paragraph underscores is the logical problem that religious moralists, say, face when they regard moral judgments as something other than an agent's starting his feelings when confronted by a particular situation.
Hunter himself voices a most serious criticism against his analysis of Hume's theory of moral judgment when he says that according to his account Hume becomes incapable of explaining ethical disagreement.
If all one does in making a moral judgment is report on his emotional reaction to a contemplated course of action, say, then it is entirely possible for two disputants to admit to each other that their opponent's feelings move them in ways directly contrary to their own feelings, thus effectively preventing ethical disagreement from ever getting off the ground.
Also, Hunter, like Maclntyre, in ignoring the literal import of the paragraph, fails to do justice to a key element in Hume's argument against the rationalists.
In trying to determine to what extent the account of morals in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals diverges from or expands upon the argument found in the Treatise, we are afforded an insight, I believe, into how to construe the 'is-ought paragraph' in a way that will both accommodate Hume's criticism of the rationalists as well as render intelligible his own theory of moral judgement. If you then enquire why he desires health he will readily reply because sickness is painful.
If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is the ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.
Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask why he is anxious on that head he will answer because he desires to get money.
If you demand Why?
It is the instrument of pleasure says he.
And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.
It is impossible there can be a progress in infinity; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord.or agreement with human sentiment and affection.
Hume's argument here, I believe, is crucial for an understanding of his views on moral judgment, and indeed of the structure of argument in his philosophy as a whole. It is very easy to misinterpret Hume in this passage.
One might think that he is making the rather innocuous-sounding logical point that in order to avoid an infinite regress an argument must stop somewhere, and he has found it most plausible to rest his argument in morals with a statement to the effect that a particular type of character or state of affairs is most conducive to pain or pleasure. Viewed in this light, the argument is singularly unpersuasive, because we are not told why we should stop at this particular resting-place. We have escaped an infinite regress only at the cost of ah arbitrariness that may leave us equally dissatisfied.
I believe that if read correctly Hume in this passage does meet the charge of arbitrariness by moving the argument on to a different level. The crucial phrases in the passage in my view are "but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties", in the first paragraph, and "Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection" in the second.
These words should be construed entirely literally. The reason why a statement concerning an object's conduciveness towards pain or pleasure can serve as an ultimate statement in an argument is because when we speak the language of pain or pleasure we are no longer speaking the pure language of reasons, but have introduced the idiom of causes, i.e., the idiom of universal connection. We are so constituted that we want to avoid pain and seek whatever affords us pleasure. The feelings of pleasure and pain that precede and accompany the utterance of a moral judgment conform to the general rules Hume lays down for distinguishing genuine causal, relations from mere haphazard connections in nature.
The feeling of pleasure and pain are contiguous in time with the judgment and are always experienced prior to it. A constant union is evident between the cause and the effect, and we can say with pragmatic certainty that the same cause always produces the same effect and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. Thus, according to Hume, without experiencing the conjunction on any particular occasion, we are licensed to predict, on the basis of past evidence, that the feeling will occasion the judgment. what one might describe as initial conditions. Mr. Jones has been X's benefactor. He has generously endowed X's entire education, making it possible for X to achieve whatever economic or social status he has. He has now asked a special favor of X, to serve as a tutor to his grandchild, and advise him on his education needs. According to Hume, once these initial factors are given, an almost automatic process ensues. X feels a sentiment of approbation well up within him at the thought of showing gratitude towards his benefactor. An element of conscious reflection enters for Hume in the fact that this sentiment arises when X considers the virtue of gratitude in a relatively disinterested fashion-i.e., the overall benefits to be reaped from a widespread adoption of the social practice of showing graditude. When X pursues this thought-and according to Hume we are so constituted by the operation of sympathy that we cannot help entertaining this thought if we have been properly socialized and educated-a sentiment of approval follows. This sentiment of approval undergirds the moral judgment that the act of gratitude in question ought to be performed. We may now translate Hume's theory of moral judgment into the following neutral covering law schema:
(1) Event to be explained: Y's moral judgment that X's account of gratitude should be performed.
(2) Initial Conditions:
X knows that Jones is his benefactor. In the logical rigor which he imposes on the proper form of moral argument, the most essential feature of such an argument, its conclusion that a particular judgment is correct, seems to have eluded Hume's grasp. How does Hume make the move from his discussion of the logical constraints upon moral argument to a delineation of a particular form of argument that would entail the conclusion, "And the moral judgment is correct?".
The correctness of the moral judgment that the conclusion of the argument in third person discourse yields is already guaranteed, I think, in the premises of the argument. By referring to the mechanism of sympathy in his premises, the spectator is already making a covert reference to the correctness of the judgment, since what attests to its correctness for Hume is just the fact that it is motivated by sympathy. 
